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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ANGIE BRAKE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010204-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the warrantless search of Brake's vehicle was permissible and/or justified 
under the Fourth Amendment? In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial 
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). This 
issue was preserved in a motion to suppress and a suppression hearing (R. 29-40, 103). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of all controlling statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the 
Addenda. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Angie Brake appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, Fourth District Court, after the entry of a conditional plea to 
the charge of attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Angie Brake was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on 
February 9, 2000, with the following criminal violations: possession of cocaine, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-
37a-5(a) (R. 4). 
On May 15, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn W. 
Davis at which time Brake was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of 
probable cause; and pleas of "not guilty" were entered upon arraignment (R. 19-20, 64). 
On July 5, 2000, Brake filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on grounds that the 
search of her vehicle constituted an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (R. 29-40). On August 7, 2000, a 
suppression hearing was held before Judge Davis (R. 41-42). On October 10, 2000, 
Judge Davis denied Brake's Motion to Suppress in a signed memorandum decision (R. 
50-64). 
On December 4, 2000, Brake entered a plea of "guilty" to attempted possession of 
a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, conditioned upon her right to appeal the 
denial of her motion to suppress (R. 73-74, 78). 
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On January 29, 2001, Brake was sentenced to thirty-days in the Utah County Jail, 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $850.00, and placed on supervised probation for a 
period of twenty-four months (R. 86-88, 104). 
On February 26, 2001, Brake, through current counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal in 
Fourth District Court and this action commenced (R. 95). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Sergeant Neil Castlebeny 
Neil Castlebeny, a sergeant with the Utah County Sheriffs Office, testified that he 
was patrolling in the area of West Geneva Road on the evening of January 29, 2000, at 
approximately 11:45 p.m., when he observed two vehicles—a green Nissan car and a 
white Chevy truck—in a small pullout between the road and the lake (R. 102 at 14-15). 
The vehicles were parked in the southbound direction off the right-hand side of the road 
(R. 102 at 29). Castlebeny pulled in behind the vehicles "to determine whether or not 
they needed assistance" (R. 102 at 15, 30). Castlebeny testified that the engine to the 
truck was running, but that he did not know if the green Nissan's engine was on (R. 102 
at 30). 
Castlebeny first approached the driver's side window of the green car and spoke 
with an individual in the driver's seat after the driver had rolled the window down (R. 
102 at 15-16, 30). The individual in the driver's seat was a fifteen-year old female (R. 
102 at 31). Castlebeny asked the vehicle's occupants what they were doing and was 
informed that they were sitting and talking (R. 102 at 31). Castlebeny then asked the 
female in the driver's seat for identification and learned that she was fifteen years old and 
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that she had not been driving the vehicle (R. 102 at 31). Castleberry was informed that 
the owner of the vehicle was sitting in the back seat (R. 102 at 16). 
Castleberry's report indicated that he "asked if everything was okay and informed 
that inasmuch as [the female in the driver's seat] was only 15 years old, that they would 
have to be getting her home soon (R. 102 at 33-34). On cross-examination, Castleberry 
affirmed that his concern at this time was that there were juvenile(s) present in a place 
and at a time which could be dangerous to them (R. 102 at 34). 
Castleberry then tried to look in the vehicle but the windows were fogged (R. 102 
at 16). Although Castleberry indicated that it was "difficult" for him to see, he testified 
that he could see "two individuals in the back seat" (R. 102 at 16). 
Castleberry then went to the driver's side rear, but could not see through the 
window and so he "opened the door to be able to speak with the passenger" (R. 102 at 16, 
32). When Castleberry opened the car door, he encountered the appellant, Angie Brake 
(R. 102.at 16). Castleberry inquired of Brake as to whether she was the owner of the 
vehicle and why a fifteen-year old was sitting in the driver's seat (R. 102 at 17, 33). 
Brake informed Castleberry that she was the owner of the vehicle, that the occupants 
were from San Pete County, and that she had driven the vehicle to its present location and 
that the fifteen-year old sat in the driver's seat after their arrival (R. 102 at 17, 33). 
Castleberry said that he was concerned for the safety of the occupants because they were 
young, female and because they were parked in an area of frequent criminal activity (R. 
102 at 33). Accordingly, Castleberry asked Brake for identification (R. 102 at 33). Brake 
replied that her identification was in her purse and she pointed to the front seat and she 
offered to reach forward and retrieve it (R. 102 at 17, 34-35). 
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Castleberry did not want Brake to retrieve it so he went around the rear of the 
vehicle and opened the front door on the passenger side "to retriever her purse so that 
[he] could hand it to her, make sure that there weren't any weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18, 
35-36). Castleberry testified because there were five individuals in the two vehicles, and 
because West Geneva Road was "rather isolated", he was concerned for his safety and 
wanted to ensure that there were no weapons present and did not want anyone else 
reaching in any area of the vehicle without his control (R. 102 at 18). 
Once Castleberry opened the front door, he reached in and retrieved a purse (R. 
102 at 18). As he reached for the purse, he "noticed a small white bindle containing 
white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the purse on the front seat" toward the 
console of the vehicle (R. 102 at 18, 19). Castleberry admitted that he had to get into the 
vehicle to get the purse (R. 102 at 36). 
Castleberry questioned the occupants as to ownership of the cocaine but received 
no response (R. 102 at 37). Castleberry then asked the occupants to whom the purse 
belonged and was informed that it belonged to Lilly, who was sitting in the white truck 
(R. 102 at 38). Castleberry then picked up the purse and the cocaine and walked over to 
the truck (R. 102 at 43). Castleberry testified that he approached the truck because he did 
not know its occupants and was concerned for his safety (R. 102 at 44). 
When he got to the truck, Castleberry opened the door and asked the occupant if 
she was "Lilly" (R. 102 at 43). He then had Lilly exit the truck and asked her if the 
cocaine belonged to her (R. 102 at 45). Castleberry also field tested the bindle and it 
tested postively for cocaine (R. 102 at 19, 42, 43). 
Ultimately Castleberry found Brake's purse somewhere in the front area of the 
vehicle (R. 102 at 381 
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Castleberry subsequently interviewed Brake, without administering the Miranda 
warnings, in order to find out to whom the cocaine belonged (R. 102 at 20). Brake 
informed Castleberry that she did not know who owned the cocaine (R. 102 at 20). 
Castleberry questioned Brake further; and when he was asked by Brake what was going 
to happen, he told her that because she owned the vehicle, she was the responsible party 
and would be arrested for possession of cocaine unless someone claimed ownership of it 
(R. 102 at 20-21). Castleberry testified that Brake then admitted to ownership of the 
cocaine (R. 102 at 21). Castleberry also testified that Brake claimed ownership of some 
drug paraphernalia that was found in the back window of the vehicle (R. 102 at 21). 
Brake later informed Castleberry that the cocaine belonged to the driver of the white 
truck, Juan Carlos Juarez and that everyone in both vehicles had used from that same 
container (R. 102 at 25, 28). 
B. Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Deputy Shawn Chipman 
Shawn Chipman, a deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Department, was 
patrolling in Pleasant Grove in Utah County on the evening of January 29, 2000 (R. 102 
at 5-6, 7). Chipman received a call from Sergeant Castleberry at approximately 11:00 
p.m. for assistance on West Geneva Road (R. 102 at 6,8). 
When Chipman arrived, Castleberry had found a substance that field tested 
positive for cocaine (R. 102 at 6). Chipman then searched, incident to arrest, the 
passenger compartment of the green Nissan and found a cannister in the back of the car 
near the rear window which contained a plastic straw and a razor blade (R. 102 at 6-
7,11,12). Chipman testified that he transported Brake to the Utah County Jail and that he 
had a conversation with her (R. 102 at 7). Chipman testified that he did not know if 
Brake had been mirandized (R. 102 at 7). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Brake asserts that Sergeant Castleberry's opening of the front passenger door to 
her vehicle constituted a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution that was not justified either by probable cause or as a search for 
weapons under Terry v. Ohio, Accordingly, Brake asks that this Court correct the legal 
conclusion of the trial court that the warrantless search was justified on grounds of 
"officer safety"; and that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with 
instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF BRAKE'S VEHICLE WAS NOT 
JUSTIFIED UNDER ANEXCEPTION TO THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES 
Brake asserts that the Sergeant Castleberry's warrantless search of her vehicle, 
which took place when he opened the front passenger door, was not justified or 
permissible under an exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against 
warrantless searches. Accordingly, Brake requests that this Court correct the trial court's 
legal conclusion that the warrantless search of her vehicle was justified and remand this 
matter back to the Fourth District Court with instructions that her plea is to be withdrawn, 
the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
The presumptive rule under Fourth Amendment case law "relating to reasonable 
searches and seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant supported 
by probable cause." State v. James, 2000 LIT 80 at [^9, 13 P.3d 576. While an individual 
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has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment while in a vehicle." State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has 
resulted in an ''automobile exception" to the warrant rule which allows officers the ability 
to "'temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity for the purposes of conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion." James, 
2000 UT 80 at 1J10. The detention must be "temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." James, 2000 UT 80 at n.2. 
In addition, "owing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature of the 
intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to leave the vehicle during the 
course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80 at f 10. However, "if no arrest is made, 
an officer may make a warrantless search of the automobile only if there is probable 
cause for the search" or "if the officer has a reasonable and 'articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is potentionally dangerous'" and "'may gain immediate control of weapons.'" 
Schlosser, 114 P.2d at 1135, 1137 (citing United States v. Ross, 434 U.S. 798, 825, 102 
S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) and quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 
1049, 1052-55 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 3482-83 n.16, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). 
Moreover, the opening of a vehicle to search for physical evidence door constitutes a 
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. James, 2000 UT 80 at \ 13; Schlosser, 11A P.2d 
at 1135-36. See also, New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-115, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67, 
89L.Ed.2d81(1986). 
Brake asserts that a warrantless search of her vehicle occurred when Sergeant 
Castlebeny opened the front passenger door of her vehicle. The car door was opened not 
in furtherance of his investigation of the curfew violation but was conducted as a means 
8 
of retrieving physical evidence. Brake, likewise asserts, that Castlberry's warrantless 
search of her vehicle, which resulted in the discovery of cocaine, was not supported by 
probable cause. 
In this case, the only possible criminal activity which Castleberry was justified in 
investigating was a curfew violation of the fifteen-old female, who was sitting in the 
driver's seat. Castleberry observed no other criminal activity nor did he have reasonable 
and articulable suspicion of any other criminal activity. Moreover, Castleberry did not 
arrest-nor even cite-the juvenile(s) for the curfew violation. Accordingly, Castleberry 
lacked probable cause of other criminal activity which would justify his opening of the 
car door. 
Brake also asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the warrantless search of 
her vehicle was justified for the purpose of "officer safety" (R. 60-61). In support of his 
decision denying Brake's motion to suppress on grounds of "officer safety", Judge Davis 
cites the following facts: One, Castleberry was "alone and had not yet called for backup" 
(R. 61). Two, it was late at night, dark and the occupants were from San Pete County (R. 
60). Three, the road was "deserted" (Id.).1 Four, there were two vehicles present with a 
total of five occupants (Id.). Five, it was an area with frequent criminal activity (Id.). 
Six, Castleberry's vision was restricted because of darkness and fog on the vehicle 
windows (Id.). Seven, the engine in at least one of the vehicles was running (Id.). 
The only legal authority cited by Judge Davis in relation to this issue is State v. 
Grinier, 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983). However, the holding of Grinier was that the 
officers warrantless search of luggage taken without consent from the back seat of the 
Castleberry's actual description was that the road was "rather isolated" (R. 102 at 
18). 
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defendant's vehicle was not justified by exigent circumstances or the automobile 
exception, and that accordingly, the defendant's conviction had to be reversed. While the 
Grinier court noted that circumstances which place the police in danger could justify a 
warrantless search, the court did not elaborate any factors suggesting police danger nor 
engage in any analysis concerning this issue. 659 P.2d at 552. In addition, the court, 
citing the United States Supreme Court, indicated that "Any exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are to be drawn carefully and interpreted jealously, with the burden placed 
on the party asserting the exception." 659 P.2d at 551-552 (citation omitted). 
Castleberry testified that he opened the front passenger door in order to retrieve 
Brake's purse "so that [he] could hand it to her, make sure that there weren't any 
weapons" (R. 102 at 17-18, 35-36). Castleberry further elaborated that because he was 
alone on an isolated road, and because there were five individuals in the two vehicles, he 
was concerned for his safety and wanted to insure that there were no weapons present (R. 
102 at 18). 
Brake maintains that Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment was not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that Brake or 
the other occupants of the vehicle were dangerous or that there were weapons present. 
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137-38. "An officer may search a vehicle for weapons if 
he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and 'may gain immediate control 
of weapons.'" Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1137 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. at 
3481). However, "'due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he 
is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.'" Schlosser, 114 P.2d at 1137 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 
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Brake asserts that Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger compartment 
was not justified as a weapons search for officer safety. First, if Castleberry was really 
concerned for his safety because of the lateness of the hour, the darkness and isolation of 
the location, the presence of multiple vehicles and occupants, and the fog on the windows 
created by the cold, he would have immediately called for backup. Judge Davis found 
that when Castleberry retrieved the purse he had not yet called for backup (R. 61). Two, 
if Castleberry had been truly fearful of his safety he would have immediately had the 
occupants leave the vehicles to conduct a Terry frisk of their persons. Three, "nothing 
about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated [a curfew violation] 
prompted a concern for safety., [and] [n]othing [Brake] did, by way of conduct, attitude, 
or gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon in the vehicle." State v. Chapman, 921 
P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996). 
Accordingly, Castleberry's warrantless search of the passenger compartment was 
not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that Brake or the other occupants 
of the vehicle were dangerous or that there were weapons present. Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 
1135, 1137-38. Brake asks that this Court correct the trial court's conclusion that 
Castleberry "was justified in opening the passenger door" for "officer safety" (R. 60-61). 
l i 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Brake asks that this Court reverse her conviction of 
attempted possession of cocaine because the officer's warrantless search of her vehicle 
was not supported by probable cause or justified as a weapons search. Brake further asks 
that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District with instructions that her plea is to be 
withdrawn, the evidence suppressed, and the matter dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J^day of June, 2001. 
Margaret P. Lindsay A 
Counsel for Appellant ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this M_ day of June, 2001. 
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PAUL DEWITT (8619) \ T A i CCl'KT Y 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION DM «V 39 
Attorneys for Defendant 00 JUL " 5 vn D* 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84901 
Telephone 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
¥ 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANGIE M. BRAKE, 
Defendant, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 001400514 
JUDGE LYNN W. DAVIS 
ANGIE M. BRAKE, through her counsel of record, Paul DeWitt, respectfully requests 
that all evidence seized and statements of Defendant made as a direct or indirect result of 
seizures, searches and or arrest conducted by the State on the date in question in this case be 
suppressed. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. On January 29,2000, Deputy Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriff s Department contacted 
Defendant in her vehicle. The vehicle in question was parked off Geneva Road in Orem Utah. 
The purpose of the stop was "to determine whether or not they needed assistance. . . " 
Testimony of Deputy Castleberry (hereinafter Castleberry) at 15(13). 
2. The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle impossible. 
Castleberry at 16(15-20). 
3. A fifteen-year old was sitting in the driver's seat of the vehicle while Defendant was sitting in 
the rear seat with an apparent boyfriend. Castleberry at 17(1-15). 
4 Because it v. as apparently passed curfew, and a juvenile was present, Deputy Castleberry 
sought identification from Defendant Castleberry at 17(20). 
5 Deputy Castleberry testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the curfew 
violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's time 
to be headed for home." Castleberry at 37(16-18) 
6 After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castleberry then opened the rear 
door on the dnver's side of the vehicle to speak with Defendant. Castleberry at 16(19). 
7 Officer Castleberry apparently asked Defendant for identification Defendant indicated that 
her ID was m the front seat. Castleberry at 17(6-7). 
8. Officer Castleberry then retrieved the purse himself, "I opened the door to reach in to retrieve 
what I believed to be her purse As I reached for the purse, I noticed a small white bindle 
containing a white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the purse on the front seat." 
Castleberry at 18(18-22). 
9. Subsequent to entenng the vehicle, finding the evidence, and seizing the drugs, Deputy 
Castleberry spoke with Defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found That questioning 
was conducted without giving Defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42(9-11). 
10. Deputy Castleberry questioned Defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He further testified 
that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs (2) that person would be 
Defendant if no one else claimed the drugs, and (3) that Defendant was not free to leave 
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during questioning. Castleberry at 41(11-25) - 42(1-8). 
11. Specifically, during the questioning of Defendant, Miss Blake asked the deputy what was 
going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns the 
cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for 
what is in side your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came 
forth and claimed possession of it." Castleberry at 20(21-25) - 21(1-5). 
12. Defendant has never been arrested prior to this incident and has no criminal record. 
I. The Search of Defendant's Vehicle Was Made Without a Warrant. 
Regarding the issue of the search of Defendant's vehicle during which Deputy Castleberry 
testified he found drugs, Defendant makes the following points: 
1. Defendant is guaranteed freedoms from unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
2. On or about the 12th day of December, 1999 Defendant was stopped and a search was 
conducted by deputies of the Utah County Sheriffs Department without authority of a search 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on the strength of the facts set forth in a sworn affidavit. The 
search specifically objected to is the search of the Defendant's vehicle. 
3. "Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they meet the criteria 
of an accepted exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." State v. Wright, 977 
P.2d 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). See also, Camarav Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Katz v 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Cady v Dombrosky, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); State v Arroyo, 796 
P.2nd 684 (Utah, 1990). 
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4. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement to substantiate such seizure, search, and/or arrest. See Arroyo, supra; 
State v Shoulderblade, 905 P.2nd 289 (Utah, 1995). 
5. All statements made by Defendant as the direct result of any illegal search must also be 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471,487-88, (1963); State 
v. Romero, 629 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1981) ("for such evidence to be admissible, despite its 
connection with the illegally obtained evidence, it must spring basically from an independent 
motivation by the witness to make the disclosure"). 
II. The Statement's Made by Defendant to the Officer Were Made Without Miranda 
Warnings. 
Defendant argues above, that all statements made by Defendant must be suppressed under 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. However, should the State provide to the court a valid 
exception for a warrantless search and the court rules the search valid, Defendant's statements must 
be suppressed because Deputy Castleberry to give Defendant a Miranda warning. 
1. Miranda Law 
1. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that Defendant shall 
not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,...." 
2. Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[t]he accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself;...." 
3. In American Fork v Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah, 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that Article I, Section 12 protects only against compelling an accused to give "evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature." 
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4. In Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court issued the 
landmark opinion meant to insure that all accused persons are specifically advised of their Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent. The Court issued the following mandatory directives: 
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, 
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the 
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id., 444. 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, 
and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner 
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before 
speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and 
indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not 
question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or 
volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain 
from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 
thereafter consents to be questioned. Id., 444-445. 
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this 
system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has a right to consult with 
an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent 
him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with 
counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a 
lawyer if he has one or has funds to obtain one. The warning of the right to counsel 
would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent - the 
person most often subjected to interrogation - the knowledge that he too has the 
right to have counsel present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and 
of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the 
indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to 
exercise it. Id, 473. 
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement 
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his 
right to retained or appointed counsel. Id, 475. 
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To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is 
subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. 
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege,... [h]e must be 
warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything 
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the 
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be 
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Id, 478-479. 
5. In Salt Lake City v Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah, 1983), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted 
the meaning of the Miranda phrase "deprived of his freedom ... in any significant way" in the 
context of a DUI stop. The Court referred to an observation from State v Tellez, 431 P.2d 691 
(Arizona App. Ct., 1967), also a DUI stop, that "the formal arrest is not an adequate dividing line to 
use as a rule to determine when the warnings of constitutional rights must be given after a suspect 
has been stopped, since the temptation would be too great for officers to postpone formal arrest until 
a full questioning was completed." The Carner Court then adopted a four-pronged test from another 
Arizona case (State v Riffle, 638 P.2d 732 (Arizona, 1981)) as the method to use to determine if a 
person has been "deprived of his freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda 
warnings. The four Carner factors are as follows: 
(1) The site of the interrogation, 
(2) Whether the investigation focused on the accused, 
(3) Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present, 
(4) The length and form of the interrogation. Carner, at 1171. 
6. In State v Wood, 868 P.2d 70 (Utah, 1993), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the Carner 
test in spite of the United States Supreme Court's holdings in two cases decided in the interim 
between Carner and Wood which each held that the proper test to determine when one has been 
"deprived of his freedom in any significant manner" is when the person has a reasonable belief that 
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he or she is in police custody of a type associated with formal arrest.1 The Wood Court explained it 
was rejecting the State's request to abandon the Camer test and was reaffirming it because Carner 
interpreted an accused's rights under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.2 The Wood 
opinion further noted that the Utah Court of Appeals had added a fifth factor to the Carner test 
(whether the accused came to the place of the interrogation freely and voluntarily)3; the Wood Court 
corrected the Court of Appeals, stating, "[t]he defendant's willingness to come to the site of the 
interrogation, however, falls within the objective indicia of arrest and therefore is not truly an 
additional factor."4 
7. In 1992, prior to the Utah Supreme Court's Wood decision, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
an opinion in State v Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995 (Ut. Ct App., 1992)[MirquetIl where it decided that an 
automobile driver, who had been stopped for a speeding violation, was in the custody of a state 
trooper for Miranda purposes at the time that the trooper began to use coercive and accusatory 
statements to request (command?) that the driver retrieve suspected marijuana from the driver's car. 
The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued its opinion in State v Mirquet, 268 UAR 3 
(Utah, 1995) [Mirquet III after Wood. The Utah Supreme Court cited to the standard ofBeheler and 
Berkemer, stating "[t]he standard for determining when a defendant is cin custody' for Miranda 
purposes is well-settled. 'The safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a 
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.'" The Mirquet II 
'California vBeheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) and Berkemer v McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 
(1984). 
2Wood, supra, at 82. See also Wood, supra, footnote no. 2. 
3State v Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100(Ut. Ct. App., 1991). 
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Court then when on to explain that accusatory questioning, alone, while probative, is not 
determinative of the custody issue. Rather, the four Carner factors should be employed to guide 
courts in determining whether a person's freedom of action has been curtailed 'to a degree 
associated with formal arrestV 
8. The United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Stansbury v California, 511 U.S. 318, 
(1994) in which it clarified its interpretation of whether and when one is "in custody" under the 
Fifth Amendment, short of a formal arrest. The Stansbury court reiterated that "the ultimate inquiry 
is simply whether there [was] a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree 
associated with a formal arrest." Citing to Beheler, supra (quoting Oregon v Mathiason, 429 U.S. 
492 (1977). The Stansbury Court clarified that the "custody" determination... 
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective 
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. 
"The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would 
have understood the situation." (Quoting Berkemer, supra.) 
In sum, an officer's views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs 
concerning the relative culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one 
among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in 
custody, but only if the officer's views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the 
individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in 
that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. 
Our cases make it clear, in no uncertain terms, that any inquiry into whether the 
4Wood, supra, footnote no. 3. 
5It is curious that in Wood the Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's request to 
abandon the Carner test in favor of the Beheler/Berkemer standard, explaining that the four-
pronged Carner test was decided under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Here, the 
Utah Supreme Court adopts both the B eheler/B erkemer standard and the Camer test but does 
not clearly articulate whether either is required by the Fifth Amendment or Article I, Section 12, 
or both. 
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interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being 
questioned (assuming those suspicions remain undisclosed) is not relevant for 
purposes of Miranda. 
9. Even though Stansbury was issued prior to Mirquet II, the State of Utah was apparently 
unaware of its publication. Nevertheless, because of the holding in Stansbury, the State of Utah 
sought and was granted a rehearing of the Mirquet II decision by the Utah Supreme Court, "to ... 
clarify]... the standards determining when a person who is interrogated by police prior to an actual 
arrest is deemed to be "in custody" and entitled to a Miranda warning. In State v Mirquet, 914 P.2d 
1144 (Utah, 1996) [Mirquet III] the Utah Supreme Court, following Stansbury, "[made] explicit that 
where an officer has made an uncommunicated decision to arrest a detained person, accusatory 
questioning of that person does not necessarily require Miranda warnings." The Mirquet HI Court 
continued by restating the B eheler/B erkemer standard that a person is deemed to be in custody 
when that person's "freedom of action is curtailed 'to a degree associated with formal arrest.'" The 
Court explained further that "Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances are such 
that they 'exhert[] upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of 
his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.'" 
(Quoting from Berkemer, supra. The Court distinguished this test from the "not free to leave" test 
which determines when a seizure has occurred. The Court also noted that while "the accusatory 
nature of questioning is a relevant factor in determining whether a person is in custody, we 
recognize that it is not determinative of the issue. [E]ven if a person is a suspect and accusatory 
questioning takes place in a police station, the person is not necessarily 'in-custody' if there is no 
arrest or restriction on his freedom of movement and the interrogated person is free to terminate the 
interview and leave." Again, as in Wood, while recognizing the B eheler/B erkemer standard, the 
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Court also reaffirmed the four-pronged Carner test as the guide to determining when one is in 
custody short of a formal arrest. In footnote 3 of Mirquet III the Court adds "although we have 
employed Carner to decide the question of when a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda 
analysis under the Fifth Amendment,... this Court has never specifically held that Miranda-type 
warnings are required under the Utah Constitution." (Citations.) "Thus, to the extent that fWood] 
and other cases state that Carner afforded broader protections than those available under United 
States Supreme Court decisions applying Miranda law, we disavow those statements."6 
2. Argument 
In the present case, Miss Brake asserts she should have been warned by Deputy Castleberry 
of her constitutional Miranda rights. See Dickersonv.U.S., 2000 WL 807223 (2000) (Recent U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling that Miranda is a constitutionally based doctrine). 
The factors to consider when analyzing Miranda warnings suggest that Deputy Castleberry 
erred in not explaining to Miss Brake her constitutional rights. Defendant is not experienced or 
knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure. Deputy Castleberry's questioning of her after finding 
the drugs was focused directly upon her guilt. Deputy Castleberry also testified that Defendant was 
not free to leave. He also expressly informed her that she would be arrested if no one else claimed 
ownership of the drugs. These statements were made after the deputy had already spoken with the 
others present at the time. Taken together, these facts suggest that a reasonable person in Miss 
Brake's shoes (knowledge, experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject 
6
 Defendant presumes this footnote in Mirquet HI definitively provides that both the 
Beheler/Berkemer standard guided by the four Carner factors are to be employed when 
determining whether an interrogated person is in custody for Miranda analysis and that the 
appellate courts of Utah have not yet determined whether a Miranda-type warning is required by 
the Utah Constitution. 
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of a custodial interrogation by Deputy Castleberry. Given the law discussed above, the 
interrogation of Defendant should have occurred only after her Miranda rights were explained to 
her. 
It is true that Miss Brake had not been formally arrested when she made the statements. 
However, formal arrest is not a mandatory prerequisite before police must give Miranda warnings. 
The totality of the circumstances, the surrounding facts, the Deputy's expressed intent to arrest 
Defendant, his statement that Defendant was not free to leave, combined with Defendant's 
inexperience with the criminal justice system are all mandate that the Miranda warning should have 
been given to Defendant prior to her interrogation. Because no Miranda warning was given, 
Defendant's statements to Deputy Castleberry must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that all evidence and statement of 
Defendant derived as a direct or indirect result of the aforementioned seizure, search and/or arrest 
be suppressed and ruled inadmissible at the trial of this matter, until and unless the prosecution can 
establish a constitutionally recognized exception to the warrant requirement and further that all 
government action be valid in both its inception and scope. In the alternative, if the State provides a 
warrant exception that the court accepts, the statements of Defendant must still be suppressed as 
they were given without the arresting officer advising Defendant of her Miranda rights. Defendant 
further asks the court to schedule a hearing on this matter at its earliest convenience. 
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Respectfully submitted this 5th day of July, 2000. 
f 
kJ 
Paul DeWitt 
Counsel for Defendant 
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Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5, 2000. A 
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7, 2000. Defendant was present and was 
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 
represented the State of Utah. 
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time to file a 
memorandum. The State filed its Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on August 15, 2000. 
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and 
legal memoranda, now finds and rules as follows: 
1. On January 29, 2000, Deputy Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was 
on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the 
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant. 
2. Officer Castleberry testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent 
criminal activity." Transcript at page 33. 
3. It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m. when Officer 
Castleberry spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castleberry stopped to investigate and "to 
determine whether or not they needed assistance. . ." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a 
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle. 
4. He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was 
running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running. 
5. The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle 
impossible. Castleberry at 16 (15-20). 
6. A fifteen-year-old girl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was 
sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or 
communicating in English. Castleberry at 17 (1-15). 
7. Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to 
drive the vehicle, Deputy Castleberry sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the 
owner of the vehicle. Castleberry at 17 (20). 
8. Deputy Castleberry testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the 
curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's 
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants 
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive 
the vehicle. Castleberry at 37 (16-18). 
9. After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castleberry then 
opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was 
unable to see her through the window or from his vantage at the driver's open window. 
10. Officer Castleberry asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or 
pointed to a purse in the front passenger seat. Officer Castleberry testified that he decided to 
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control. 
Castleberry at 17(6-7). 
11. Officer Castleberry, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself. "I 
opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse. . . As I reached for the 
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the 
purse on the front seat." The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse 
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and the console. The purse on the front seat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's 
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtained from the purse on the front seat. Castleberry 
at 18(18-22). 
12. Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castleberry 
in the front passenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove 
compartment or the floor area, but was not on the front seat. 
13. Subsequent to entering the vehicle, finding the evidence, and seizing the drugs, 
Deputy Castleberry spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning 
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42 (9-11). 
14. Deputy Castleberry questioned defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He 
further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person 
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave 
during questioning. Castleberry at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8). 
15. Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy 
what was going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns 
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for 
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth 
and claimed possession of it." Castleberry at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5). 
16. Officer Castleberry had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He 
conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castleberry continued his investigation and 
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles. 
17. Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a 
razor blade. These items were located "up against the back window" of the Nissan near where 
the defendant was sitting. 
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ISSUES 
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject 
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer 
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was Sgt. Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took 
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle, 
permissible and justified? 
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exceptior 
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v Arrov, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington 
Court of Appeals case, State v. Grinier, 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the 
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create a risk of loss or 
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If thi; 
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this 
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it. 
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's 
decision to retrieve defendant's driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript, 
page 17, line 10-25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 14-
25, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached. 
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of 
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to 
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts: 
1. He was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup. 
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2. It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah 
County. 
3. The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry 
described it as a "deserted road." 
4. There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in 
the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.) 
5. This was an area of frequent criminal activity. 
6. His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of 
the windows were fogged up. 
7. The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the 
subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl behind the wheel and two 
other passengers in the back seat. 
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight 
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged 
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the 
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door. 
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been 
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her 
and presumably did not contain her license. 
The Mirquet ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a 
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda 
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are 
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they 
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free 
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned 
of his constitutional rights. 
The "not free to leave" standard, on the other hand, determines whether 
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person 
may be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for 
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody" for Miranda 
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the 
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather 
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the 
examination. 
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, 
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to 
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an 
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during 
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective, 
unstated intent to arrest the driver. . . 
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a 
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake City v Carnen 664 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1983), set out four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the 
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether 
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the 
interrogation" . . . 
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying 
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the 
police car; 2) Officer Mangelson's investigation focused solely on defendant; 
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation 
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet 
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation 
added to the coercive environment. 
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate 
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146, 47 & 48. 
(Emphasis added). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation 
to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant? 
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Both sides rely upon the case of State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This 
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts 
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not 
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing. 
Likewise, the defendant relies upon "facts" that are not in evidence, such as "the 
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant 
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in 
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system" 
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to 
interrogation. 
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge, 
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial 
interrogation by Deputy Castleberry. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is 
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience 
and understanding or her "inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at 
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castleberry knew about or inquired 
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or 
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible. 
In the case at bar, Officer Castleberry observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger 
side front seat immediately after he opened the front door. He picked it up and asked who owned 
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who 
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a 
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castleberry was speaking with this 
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castleberry directed him to search 
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castleberry 
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of 
cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I 
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine." 
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the 
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds: 
1. The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castleberry's patrol 
vehicle; 
2. The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles; 
3. There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained 
in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which 
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence. 
4. The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory 
statements. 
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had 
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings. But 
once she had admitted "the specific bindle was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue 
that was found within the box. . ." the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and 
should have been. 
RULING 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the 
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial. 
cc: David Clark, Esq. 
Paul Dewitt, Esq. 
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A. I spoke with her and --to try to determine some 
identification on her, whether or not she was indeed the 
owner of the vehicle, and why there was a 15 year old sitting 
in the driver's seat. 
Q. What did Miss Brake tell you at that point? 
A* She said that she did own the car and that her 
identification was in the front seat in her purse. 
Q. Did she give any explanation for the young person 
sitting in the front seat? 
A. I'm not sure if it transpired right then, but later 
on I believe she stated that she had indeed driven there 
herself, and while they were there ~ apparently they had 
been there for some time prior to my arrival -- there had 
been some changing of seating and that the 15 year old had 
jusc gotten in the front seat for whatever reason. 
Q. And so did you ask Miss Brake for any 
identification? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did she say in response? 
A. She said that she had her identification in the --
in her purse in the front seat. 
Q. Did she point towards the purse? 
A. I believe she did. 
Q. What did you do? 
A. I then walked around the rear of the vehicle and 
Utah State Courts 
opened the front door to retrieve her purse so that I could 
hand it to her, make sure there weren't any weapons. At this 
point I was concerned -- there were numerous individuals, a 
total of five, if I recall right. West Geneva Road is a 
rather isolated area. I was concerned for my safety, to make 
sure that there weren't any weapons. I had a lot of people 
to deal with. It was late at night. It was cold. So I did 
not want anyone else reaching in any area of the vehicle 
without my control, so I -
Q. Now there were three individuals in the green 
Nissan; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And two in the white pickup? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Were the two groups affiliated with each other? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. What did you do exactly when you opened the door? 
A. I opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I 
believed to be her purse. It was a purse sitting on the 
front seat, passenger side. As I reached for the purse, I 
noticed a small white bindle containing white powdery 
substance sitting adjacent to the purse on the front seat. 
MR. CLARK: Thank you. Your Honor, may I approach 
the clerk? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Utah State Courts 
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A. I said is this, in fact, your car. 
Q. What did she say to you? 
A. She said, yes, it was. 
Q. Go on. 
A. And she said -- I asked, okay, why do we have a 15 
year old sitting in the driver's seat and she said something 
to the effect that she was a friend, they were all from 
Sanpete County and indeed Jenna had not driven there, but she 
had driven there. 
Q. And I believe is it at this point in your report you 
say you learned that the girls were from Sanpete County; is 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And then what did you say from then? 
A. I said, well, I'm concerned that we have girls here 
from Sanpete County, one of which that I know to be only 15 
years of age. It's now approximately 11:45 at night, and I 
was concerned that we have young girls far away from home in 
an area that is frequented -- has been known to frequent 
criminal activity. I had asked her, Angie, if she had 
identification. 
Q. Now, earlier than that in your report you stated, 
you say, I asked if everything was okay and I informed them 
that inasmuch as Jenna was only 15 years old, that they would 
have to be getting her home soon. Is that --
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A. (Witness indicates affirmatively). 
Q, And from your report that happens prior to -- or as 
you were talking to Jenna, and not so much to Angie, but --
or was it to Angie when you said that? 
A. I don't recall. It was brought out. 
Q. Okay. So at this point you're concerned about 
you've got under age people, and I'm assuming that the fact 
that it's cold and people are talking, we have young people 
out talking -- I remember my high school days barely from the 
winter — switching cars and talking and whatever young 
people do these days, that your concern still at this point 
is you have under age children basically at a place and a 
time that probably is not the best for them to be, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now you've opened the door. You've talked to Angie, 
and there was another person there, correct? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. Did you speak with him? 
A. I attempted to speak with him. He spoke very little 
English. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. I believe I asked for his name. 
Q. Was he able to give it to you? 
A. He was. I speak fluent Spanish and had no problem 
communicating with him once we switched to Spanish. 
Utah State Courts 
JD 
Q. Okay. Good. At this point did you ask for his ID? 
A. I don't know if I asked for him at that point or 
afterward. I honestly can't tell you when that transpired. 
Ar some point I did receive some form of identification from 
him, but I cannot tell you when. 
Q. My reading of your police report and what you said, 
I suggest that right now you're more concentrated on Miss 
Brake, correct? 
A. That's correct. I want to know -- generally the 
owner and the driver of the vehicle I want to make 
responsible for who is inside that vehicle. 
Q. Absolutely. So you asked her for ID? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she says I don't have it, it's in the front 
seat? 
A. That's what she said. 
Q. She didn't have her purse in the back seat with her? 
A. She did not. 
Q. She did not hand you the ID at that time? 
A. No. 
Q. So she says it's in the front seat? 
A. If I recall right, she offered to reach forward and 
get the purse, and I told her, no, I did not want her to do 
that. 
Q. You decided to get it for her? 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. At that point you exit and walk around to the 
passenger side and you open the car door; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you then leaned in to get the purse? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. At what point did you see the bindle, if the bindle 
was next -- between the purse and the console? 
A. It was as I was reaching for the purse. 
Q. I'm a little confused. Didn't you have to move the 
purse to see the bindle? 
A. No. There was space between the two. The purse was 
toward the center of the seat. There was a space between the 
purse and the bindle, and then the edge of the seat. 
Q. Okay. But you did have to get into the vehicle to 
get the purse? 
A. Sure. 
Q. You would have to open the door. It was foggy and 
it wasn't until inside the vehicle that you actually saw the 
bindle; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. After you see the bindle, you picked it up, and I'm 
assuming from your report that you've had training in drug 
recognition; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
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